Mercer Law Review
Volume 55
Number 4 Eleventh Circuit Survey

Article 16

7-2004

Georgia's Children On Our Minds...
Nicole Sheppe

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr

Recommended Citation
Sheppe, Nicole (2004) "Georgia's Children On Our Minds...," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 55 : No. 4 , Article 16.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol55/iss4/16

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Comment

Georgia's Children
On Our Minds...

Today a child who receives proper nutrition, adequate schooling and
supportive sustaining shelter is among the fortunate, whatever the
source. A child who also receives the love and nurture of even a single
There is no reason in
parent can be counted among the blessed ....
law, logic or social philosophy to obstruct such a favorable situation.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although there is not a published opinion addressing same-sex couple
adoption in Georgia,2 it is currently a hot issue in many state courts
3
and, most recently, in the Eleventh Circuit. On January 28, 2004, a
unanimous three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

1. In re Evan, 153 Misc. 2d 844, 852 (N.Y. Stir. Ct. 1992).
2. See Overview of State Adoption Laws, Lambda Legal, availableat http://www.lambd
alegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=399 (Feb. 9, 2004).
3. See In re Evan, 153 Misc. 2d 844; In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re
B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993); Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v.
Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children
& Family Servs., No. 01-16723, 2004 WL 161275 (11th Cir. Jan. 28, 2004).
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declined to extend the reasoning of Lawrence v. Texas4 to adoptions by
homosexual couples.5 Specifically, in Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services,6 the Eleventh Circuit upheld a
Florida statute7 prohibiting homosexuals from adopting children.8
The 1977 Florida statute at issue in Lofton is unique because it
provides for an explicit ban on adoptions by homosexuals The statute
states, "[nlo person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that
person is a homosexual." 10 Most state adoption statutes, including
Georgia's, while not specifically providing for homosexual adoptions, do
not explicitly ban them.1 In addition, the American Bar Association
("ABA") does not support a complete ban on homosexual adoptions, and
its House of Delegates in February 1999 adopted a policy to support laws
allowing homosexuals to adopt when the adoption is in the best interests
of the child.12
Until Lofton, the decision in Lawrence, which overturned the Supreme
Court's 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 3 was largely viewed as
a victory for the homosexual community.'4 This feeling gathered
momentum after a November 2003 decision by the Massachusetts
Supreme Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health. 5 In
Goodridge the court cited Lawrence and struck down a state ban on
marriage licenses for same-sex couples.' 6
However, the Eleventh Circuit took a different approach with respect
to Lawrence and concluded that the Supreme Court's ruling granted no
fundamental right to homosexual sex.' 7 The court concluded "that it
is a strained and ultimately incorrect reading of Lawrence to interpret

4. 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003). In Lawrence the Supreme Court struck down a homosexual
sodomy law. Id. at 2484.
5. Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., No. 01-161275, 2004 WL
161275, at *9 (11th Cir. Jan. 28, 2004).
6. 2004 WL 161275 (11th Cir. Jan. 28, 2004).
7. FLA. STAT. ch. 63.042(3) (2003).
8. Lofton, 2004 WL 161275, at *1.
9. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Court Won't Tie Lawrence to Gay Adoption Law: 11th
Circuit Rejects Arguments by Florida Foster Parents,ABA Journal Report, available at
www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/fBadopt.html (Feb. 6, 2004).
10. FLA. STAT. ch. 63.042(3) (2003).
11. See Overview of State Adoption Laws, supra note 2; O.C.G.A. §§ 19-8-3, 19-8-6 (1999
& Supp. 2003).
12. Hudson, supra note 9.
13. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
14. See Hudson, supra note 9.
15. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
16. Id. at 959.
17. Lofton, 2004 WL 161275, at *9.

20041

GEORGIA'S CHILDREN

1417

it to announce a new fundamental right." 8 The court also emphasized
the factual differences between Lawrence, which dealt with a criminal
law, and Lofton, which dealt with a matter of "statutory privilege." 19
Specifically, the court stated that adoption is a privilege and that a state
has the right to set standards for potential adoptive parents. 20 Despite
the decision in Lofton, the plaintiffs plan to ask for a rehearing before
the three-judge panel or an en banc rehearing, or petition the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.2 '
After the recent court decisions concerning same-sex adoption in the
Eleventh Circuit, as well as in neighboring states, one may ask where
Georgia stands on this issue. This is a difficult question to answer, but
one that merits probing. The literal wording of Georgia's adoption
statutes does not explicitly provide for step-parent adoption, which could
allow the adoption by two same-sex partners jointly.22 However, it is

also clear that at the trial-court level adoption by homosexual couples is
permitted on a random basis depending on the county in which the
petition is filed and the judge presiding over the individual case, with
the majority of successful petitions in the Atlanta area. 23 Even under
a literal reading of the Georgia adoption statutes, homosexuals as
individuals (not couples) could potentially adopt a child. 24 However,
there is currently no uniform manner to analyze the benefits or
drawbacks to homosexual individuals in the application of the bestinterest-of-the-child standard, which is the policy underlying these
statutes.25
Same-sex adoptions have the potential to greatly impact children. For
example, when children are denied adoption by one or both parents who
are members of the same sex, the children lose more than stability. The
children are denied the rights of inheritance and succession, medical
insurance, life insurance, the capability of having one or two legal
guardians who can sign for emergency medical care, and the benefits of
educational funding that two parents can jointly provide.26 Although
there are legal documents, such as wills, available to parties to address
some of these issues, every situation that may arise as a parent cannot
be anticipated. It is a heavy burden to expect parents to contract for

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *3.
Hudson, supra note 9.
See O.C.G.A. §§ 19-8-3, 19-8-6 (1999 & Supp. 2003).
Overview of State Adoption Laws, supra note 2.
See O.C.G.A. § 19-8-3.
Id.
See Evan, 153 Misc. 2d at 845-47; Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 316-17.
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every right available automatically to other parents. For example, in the
event of an emergency, a de facto parent needs the ability to consent to
medical care when a child's biological parent or legal guardian is not
present. Therefore, a ban on same-sex adoption without an inquiry into
the specific facts of each case and each child's situation can potentially
have unexpected consequences.
If a person or couple is willing to provide the aforementioned benefits
to a child, is it fair to deny these benefits because of the potential
parents' sexual preference, especially if this behavior is not proven to
have negative effects on the child? Further, is it worse having two
same-sex parents or no legal parents? Is it fair to permit adoption to
some children and not others? Until the Georgia General Assembly
addresses these issues through a new or amended adoption statute,
these are questions that Georgia courts need to consider. The purpose
of this Comment is to serve as an objective analysis of the current
adoption law in this state and to help formulate a more cohesive
application of Georgia's adoption law with respect to same-sex couples.

II.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LAW IN GEORGIA

Many adoptions continue to be granted at the trial-court level, but
there is no published case that directly addresses same-sex adoption in
Georgia. Therefore, it is helpful to examine cases dealing with
homosexuality in the context of child custody and child visitation, and
to consider other, more general laws pertaining to homosexual conduct
in order to formulate a broad picture of the current published law
regarding homosexuality in this state. There appear to be two lines of
cases in Georgia: (1) those that relied on Bowers, which held that private
homosexual conduct received no federal constitutional protection,2 7 and
(2) those that departed from the reasoning in Bowers.28 Many Georgia
cases were decided before the Georgia Supreme Court decision in Powell
v. State, 9 which declined to follow Bowers, and before the recent
United States Supreme Court decision in Lawrence, which overruled
Bowers.3" Older cases in Georgia relied heavily on the reasoning that
sodomy was a crime in Georgia, and therefore same-sex couples were
given little if any protection by the law."1 However, because the law is
changing rapidly in this area, the courts do not have ample precedent to

27. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986); see also Gay v. Gay, 149 Ga. App.
173, 253 S.E.2d 846 (1979).
28. See Owens v. Owens, 247 Ga. 139, 274 S.E.2d 484 (1981).
29. 270 Ga. 327, 510 S.E.2d 18 (1998).
30. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2473.
31. See City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 265 Ga. 161, 454 S.E.2d 517 (1995).

2004]

GEORGIA'S CHILDREN

1419

rely upon when deciding cases dealing with these issues. The case law
appears to be piece meal, determined on a case-by-case basis, and often
inconsistent. In this Section, I will discuss Bowers and all relevant
cases, ending with the most recent Georgia decisions dealing with
homosexuality, and especially those regarding homosexuality and
children. In a later Section, I will discuss same-sex adoption cases from
other jurisdictions, including Florida, that might serve as persuasive
authority when a same-sex adoption petition reaches the appellate or
supreme court level in Georgia.
Bowers v.Hardwick

A.

In Bowers v. Hardwick, 2 the United States Supreme Court, in June
1986, held that the right to privacy in the United States Constitution did
not protect private sexual conduct between consenting homosexual
adults: The Constitution did not "extend a fundamental right to
homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy."3 Hardwick was
charged with violating a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy for
committing sodomy with another adult male in the bedroom of his home.
The prosecutor decided not to pursue the matter, but Hardwick brought
suit in United States District Court, challenging the constitutionality of
the statute. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. The court of appeals reversed and remanded,
holding that the Georgia statute violated respondent's fundamental
rights.34 However, the United States Supreme Court held the Georgia
statute constitutional.3" The Court noted that none of the fundamental
rights previously announced by the Court involving family relationships,
marriage, or procreation bore any resemblance to the right to private
conduct between consenting homosexual adults.3 6 Further, the Court
stated that "[a]gainst this background, [in which many states continue
to criminalize sodomy] to claim that a right to engage in such conduct
is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious."" Therefore, the Court
noted that there should be great resistance to expanding the reach of the
Due Process Clause to cover new fundamental rights.3 8 The Court

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Id. at 192.
Id. at 187-89.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 190-91.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 195.

1420

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

opined that it was irrelevant that the homosexual conduct in this case
occurred in the privacy of Hardwick's home. 9
In March 1996 the Georgia Court of Appeals decided In re R.E.W.,4°
which concerned a homosexual father who challenged an order from a
juvenile court refusing to allow him unsupervised visitation with his
daughter.4 ' Pursuant to a custody agreement, the father had supervised visitation in the child's mother's home. Further, he was involved
in a monogamous homosexual relationship for four years, but did not
believe his daughter's best interest would be served by informing her of
the sexual nature of his relationship. The father stated that he would
actively conceal the sexual aspects of his relationship from his child.
Additionally, in the home the father shared with his partner, he had his
own bedroom, and few people knew he had a sexual relationship with his
partner. The father also testified about his love for his daughter and
that their relationship would be benefited by unsupervised visitation,
which would allow them to participate in activities outside of the
mother's home, such as taking trips.42
On appeal the court reversed the order, allowing the father's
unsupervised visitation request, and held that the primary consideration
should not be the sexual behavior of the father, but whether the child
would be harmed by the conduct.43 The court reasoned that the
juvenile court premised its denial of the father's request on the finding
that he was engaged in an "immoral" relationship." Further, the court
reasoned that the juvenile court "went to great lengths to define the
father's lifestyle as immoral and illegal . . . ."" The court of appeals
agreed that in some instances a parent's "immoral conduct" might
warrant limitations on contact between a parent and a child, but only if
it is shown that the conduct adversely affects the child.4 The court
then agreed with courts from other jurisdictions, holding that the
primary consideration in determining custody and visitation issues is not
the parent's sexual preferences but whether the child will be harmed by
the parent's conduct.47 The court further stated that

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
220 Ga. App. 861, 471 S.E.2d 6 (1996).
Id. at 861, 471 S.E.2d at 7.
Id. at 861-62, 471 S.E.2d at 7-8.
Id. at 863-64, 471 S.E.2d at 8-9.
Id. at 862, 471 S.E.2d at 8.
Id. at 863, 471 S.E.2d at 8-9.
Id., 471 S.E.2d at 9.
Id.
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[for] [t]oo long... courts [have] labored under the notion that divorced
parents must somehow be perfect in every respect. The law should
recognize that parents, married or not, are individual human beings
each with his or her own particular virtues and vices .... In domestic
relations cases the courts should recognize that all parents have faults,
and look
not to the faults of the parents, but to the needs of the
48
child.

The court remanded the case and the juvenile court was instructed to
award the father unsupervised visitation. 49
In July of that same year, the Georgia Supreme Court denied
certiorari in In re R.E.W, ° and Justice Carley strongly dissented to
what he considered to be an erroneous opinion by the court of appeals."1 Specifically, Justice Carley opined that at the time In re
R.E.W. was decided sodomy violated Georgia law.52 Therefore, he
concluded that the opinion of the trial court should be reversed because
it erroneously adopted the "minority rule," allowing unrestricted
visitation rights of a parent involved in a homosexual relationship.53
Carley noted that because the court did not reverse this erroneous
opinion, "unless and until [the court] holds otherwise, the opinion of the
Court of Appeals constitutes the applicable law in Georgia."14 He
concluded by stating that "[hiopefully, another case soon will present
this Court with the opportunity to overrule this erroneous precedent."55
Two years later, in 1998, the Georgia Supreme Court provided
constitutional protection for private homosexual conduct in Powell v.
State.56 In Powell the defendant was tried for rape and aggravated
sodomy when he had a sexual relationship with his wife's seventeenyear-old niece. Defendant testified that the sexual acts were consensual,
and the jury acquitted him. Subsequently, the trial court gave a jury
instruction allowing the jury to consider a lesser included offense of
sodomy, which did not depend upon consent. The jury then convicted
defendant of sodomy, and he appealed, claiming that the trial court
erred in giving the jury instruction and that the sodomy statute was

48. Id. at 864, 471 S.E.2d at 9 (quoting Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983,985-86 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1987)).
49. Id.
50. 267 Ga. 62, 472 S.E.2d 295 (1996).
51. Id. at 62, 472 S.E.2d at 296 (Carley, J., dissenting).
52. Id. (Carley, J., dissenting).
53. Id. (Carley, J., dissenting).
54. Id., 472 S.E.2d at 297 (Carley, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Carley, J., dissenting).
56. 270 Ga. 327, 336, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (1998).
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unconstitutional. 7 The Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial
court properly gave the jury instruction. 5 However, the court reversed
the conviction, concluding that the statute at issue59 was unconstitutional and violated defendant's right to privacy.60 The court further
held that the Georgia Constitution provided protection for sexual acts
that occurred without force in a private home between persons legally
capable of consenting. 61 This decision effectively granted a greater
protection in Georgia to engage in private sexual conduct than the
protection provided by the United States Constitution pursuant to
Bowers. 2
B.

Lawrence v. Texas

In 2003 the United States Supreme Court overruled Bowers in
Lawrence v. Texas.6' In Lawrence petitioners appealed the decision of
the Texas Court of Appeals, which upheld a Texas statute 4 making it
a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain sexual
conduct. The state appellate court's decision to uphold the Texas law
was based on the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers.65 However, the
United States Supreme Court noted that in the United States there was
no history of laws specifically targeting homosexual conduct and that
earlier sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals but at all
people.66 The Court noted that laws and traditions in the last half of
the twentieth century show awareness that the principles of liberty give
6
protection to private consensual acts of adultsY.
The Court stated that
its holding in Bowers demeaned the lives of homosexuals.' Therefore,
the Court held that Texas could not demean petitioners' existence or
control their future by making their private sexual conduct a crime.6 9
In 1979, before Bowers, the Georgia Court of Appeals, in Gay v.
Gay,7 ° held that a mother was fit to gain custody of her child when she

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 327, 510 S.E.2d at 18.
Id. at 328, 510 S.E.2d at 21.
O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2(a) (2003).
Powell, 270 Ga. at 332, 510 S.E.2d at 24.
Id. at 329-30, 510 S.E.2d at 21-22.
Id. at 329 n.1, 510 S.E.2d at 21 n.1.
123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003).
123 S. Ct. at 2473.
Id.
Id. at 2474.
Id. at 2473.
Id. at 2484.
149 Ga. App. 173, 253 S.E.2d 846 (1979).
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had previously had a homosexual relationship with another woman, and
the evidence of such relationship was based on hearsay. 1 By agreement of both parents, the juvenile court originally placed custody of their
child in the Fulton County Department of Family and Children Services
("DFACS") for two years. At the end of that time, a new hearing was
held on the question of permanent custody. Although two caseworkers
from DFACS recommended that custody be placed with the mother, the
trial court concluded as a matter of fact that the mother had a relationship with another woman and for this reason alone declined to follow the
recommendation. Instead, permanent custody was awarded7 2to DFACS
with direction that the child not be placed with the mother.
The court noted that the only evidence supporting the trial court's
finding that the mother was involved in a homosexual relationship was
hearsay testimony from the father and the maternal grandmother, both
of whom wanted custody of the child. 3 Further, the mother denied
that she was involved in a homosexual relationship.74 The court
reasoned that the trial court made express findings that the father was
unfit to have custody of his child, that he had fathered five other
illegitimate children, and that his only source of income was social
security disability payments.75 The court stated that while the father's
financial situation alone was not enough to find him unfit, the fact that
he had fathered numerous children without the ability to care for them
financially was irresponsible.76
In contrast, the court noted that the trial court made no express
finding that the mother was unfit.77 Specifically, the court stated that

the mother was employed in a stable job, and her fitness as a parent was
strongly endorsed by DFACS. 78 The court reasoned that the trial
court's decision not to follow this recommendation was based solely on
the conclusion that the mother was engaged in a homosexual relationship with a woman who at one time dominated her emotionally and
mistreated the child.79 However, the court noted that there was no
evidence introduced to show that this was presently true. ° The father
testified that he witnessed some homosexual activity between the mother

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 175, 253 S.E.2d at 848.
at 173, 253 S.E.2d at 847.

at 174-75, 253 S.E.2d at 847-48.
at 175, 253 S.E.2d at 848.
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and her partner two years earlier, but stated he had not witnessed any
such conduct since that time.8 Thus, the court reasoned that the only
support for the trial court's finding of a homosexual relationship was
hearsay and awarded the mother custody.82
Chief Justice Deen dissented in Gay, asking, "[d] es an 'unnatural'
consenting relationship with another woman possibly amounting to
sodomy render a mother unfit? Do five freely made acts of generating
illegitimate offspring possibly amounting to fornication and adultery
render a father unfit?"8 He opined that both issues involved "consider8 4
Further, he noted
ations of mixed questions of law and theology."
that although some religions permit these acts between consenting
He
people, others conclude that these acts are always wrong.88
are based on the
laws
criminal
that
"Georgia
stating
by
concluded
6
latter."
A few years earlier, in Bennett v. Clemens, 7 the Georgia Supreme
Court denied custody of a child to her mother, in part because of the
mother's alternative sexual lifestyle.8 s The paternal grandparents of
a female child filed a petition seeking custody from the natural mother.
The grandparents claimed that since the mother had been granted
custody, she had abandoned and deserted the child, leaving her with
others, and that the child was living in an immoral environment. A
hearing was held, and temporary custody was given to the grandparents.
The court subsequently awarded the grandparents permanent custody.8 9 The supreme court noted that the mother moved to Atlanta and
lived in different locations for several years with the child, worked for
an underground newspaper, was arrested for possession of marijuana,
then left her daughter with female friends and went to live in San
Francisco. 9 The court further noted that the female friends, with
whom the child was left, "smoked 'pot' on occasions, engaged in sexual
acts with men and with each other in the presence of the child and...

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 176, 253 S.E.2d at 848 (Deen, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Deen, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Deen, C.J., dissenting).
Id. (Deen, C.J., dissenting).
230 Ga. 317, 196 S.E.2d 842 (1973).
Id. at 319, 196 S.E.2d at 843.
Id. at 318, 196 S.E.2d at 842.
Id. at 319, 196 S.E.2d at 843.
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taught the child about 'the gay life.'" 91 Based upon these facts, the
court affirmed the custody award to the grandparents.92
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Gunter criticized the majority
opinion, stating that the judicial branch cannot impose a standard of
morality upon parents when a determination must be made concerning
the loss of permanent custody to a third party.9 3 Specifically, Gunter
noted that the natural parents in this case were both Harvard graduates
and National Merit Scholars.' Additionally, he recognized that when
the couple divorced, the mother was awarded custody, and there was no
evidence in the record that the child's physical needs were not being
provided for or that the child was neglected, abused, or mistreated in
any way.9" Further, he noted that the father wanted his ex-wife to
have custody of their child and not the sixty-five-year-old grandparents.96
Additionally, Gunter noted that the only complaint by the grandparents in the record was that the child was "being brought up in an
immoral, hippy-type environment," which was not in the child's best
interest.9 7 He further stated that the state's right to intrude upon the
privacy of a parent-child relationship to review the manner in which a
child is being raised is limited to situations in which a child is neglected,
abused, or mistreated.9" When none of those indicia are present, the
state has no right to inquire into the way a parent chooses to raise the
child.99 Gunter stated that within the family relationship, the parent
adopts a moral standard for the family members, and the state cannot
°
intrude upon this relationship by asserting a different standard."
In 1977, also before Bowers, the Georgia Supreme Court, in Buck v.
Buck,' 01 held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
awarding custody to a mother when she admitted to a past homosexual
2
relationship and maintained friendships with other homosexuals."
In this case, the husband appealed from a final divorce decree awarding
his wife custody of their eighteen-month-old child "until such time as the

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 320, 196 S.E.2d at 843 (Gunter, J.,
Id. (Gunter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Gunter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 321, 196 S.E.2d at 844 (Gunter, J.,
Id. (Gunter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Gunter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 321-22, 196 S.E.2d at 844 (Gunter,
Id. at 322, 196 S.E.2d at 844 (Gunter, J.,
238 Ga. 540, 233 S.E.2d 792 (1977).
Id. at 541, 233 S.E.2d at 793.

dissenting).
dissenting).
J., dissenting).
dissenting).

1426

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

said child reaches the age of 30 months."0 3
The decree further
provided that when the child reached thirty months of age, psychological
evaluations of the parties and child were to be submitted to the court for
a determination of permanent custody.1°4
On appeal the husband contended that the court abused its discretion
in awarding custody to the wife because she admitted to a past
homosexual relationship and continued to maintain friendships with
homosexuals. Further, he claimed that the custody award was based on
the court's subjective opinion that a strong psychological affinity existed
between the young child and the mother.'05
However, the court
concluded that the transcript contained reasonable evidence supporting
an award of custody to either party, and that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding custody to the mother despite the
evidence pertaining to her homosexuality.'"
In 1981 the Georgia Supreme Court recognized that sexual relations
with someone of the same sex constituted adultery in Owens v.
Owens.' O7
This case imposed upon same-sex partners the same
consequences as those for other adulterous couples in the state of
Georgia.'0
In Owens the wife sued the husband for divorce on the
ground that their marriage was irretrievably broken. During discovery
the wife testified to admissions by the husband that he was either
bisexual or homosexual.' 9
She also "testified to certain instances
during their marriage in which he had displayed homosexual tendencies.""o The husband then filed a motion seeking to exclude any
evidence of his admissions or instances of his homosexual behavior."'
The trial judge ruled that "one spouse is prohibited from testifying to
any tendencies toward, or admissions or instances of, adulterous
heterosexual or homosexual behavior on the part of the other
spouse."112 The court agreed with the trial judge's ruling, noting that
Georgia law requires that adultery be proven by outside evidence and
not by the testimony of the other spouse."' The court further reasoned that "[a] person commits adultery when he or she has sexual

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 540, 233 S.E.2d at 792.
Id.
Id. at 541, 233 S.E.2d at 793.
Id.
247 Ga. 139, 140, 247 S.E.2d 484, 485-86 (1981).
Id. at 140, 247 S.E.2d at 485-86.
Id. at 139-40, 247 S.E.2d at 485.
Id.
Id. at 140, 247 S.E.2d at 485.
Id.
Id.
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intercourse with a 'person' other than his or her spouse. "114 Therefore,
the court held that both extramarital homosexual and heterosexual
relations constitute adultery.115
Justice Clarke wrote a dissenting opinion in which he reasoned that
under the majority's holding, one spouse would be allowed to testify that
the other was guilty of nagging, but the other, who might have
knowledge of homosexual conduct outside the marriage, would not be
allowed to share this with the jury.'16 Justice Clarke stated that the
not demand that homosexual relationships
definition of adultery does
117
fall within the definition.
After Bowers, in VanDyck v. VanDyck," 5 the Georgia Supreme Court
determined that O.C.G.A. section 19-6-19(b)" 9 ("the live-in lover
statute") did not permit modification of alimony when a former spouse
was living in a romantic relationship with a person of the same sex. 2 °
This case contradicts Owens by not allowing the former spouse of a
homosexual person to petition for a modification of alimony while
permitting the former spouse of someone living with the opposite sex to
do so, protecting the homosexual conduct from sanction. In VanDyck the
former husband sought termination of his alimony obligation under the
live-in lover statute on the grounds that his ex-wife was involved in a
homosexual relationship.' 2' The purpose of the statute is to give the
divorced spouse the right to modify alimony payments to a former spouse
when the former spouse begins living with someone else.'22 The trial
court denied the wife's motion to dismiss the complaint. Further, the
trial court, relying on legislative goals and intent, concluded that
O.C.G.A. section 19-6-19(b) permits modification when an alimony
recipient is sharing living quarters, and therefore expenses, with another
person of either sex. The trial court concluded that any other construction of the statute would render it unconstitutional as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.'23
The Georgia Supreme Court noted that O.C.G.A. section 19-6-19(b)
provides in part:

114. Id.
115. Id., 247 S.E.2d at 485-86.
116. Id. at 141, 247 S.E.2d at 486 (Clarke, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Clarke, J., dissenting).
118. 262 Ga. 720, 425 S.E.2d 853 (1993).
119. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(b) (1999).
120. Van Dyck, 262 Ga. at 721, 425 S.E.2d at 854.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 722, 425 S.E.2d at 855.
123. Id. at 721, 425 S.E.2d at 854.
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Subsequent to a final judgment of divorce awarding periodic payment
of alimony for the support of a spouse, the voluntary cohabitation of
such former spouse with a third party in a meretricious -relationship
shall also be grounds to modify provisions made for periodic payments
of permanent alimony for the support of the former spouse. As used
in this subsection, the word "cohabitation" means dwelling together
continuously and openly in a meretricious relationship with a person
of the opposite sex.'24
The court stated that the plain language of the statute does not apply
when the former spouse is involved in a homosexual relationship." 5
The court further opined that if the legislature intended the statute to
allow modification on the finding of the alimony recipient's cohabitation
with a person of either sex, it is the duty of the legislature, not the court,
to amend the statute. 12 6 The court also stated that the statute,
construed in light of its plain language, does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 127 The court reasoned
that the statute applied equally to former spouses or alimony recipients
of either sex, and was therefore not unconstitutional."
Specifically,
the court stated that the legislature previously amended the statute,
which formerly allowed modification based only on a former wife's
cohabitation with a man, to currently allow modification of alimony
payments to either former spouse when29 the former spouse is cohabitating with a person of the opposite sex.
In the concurring opinion, Justice Sears-Collins stated that "alimony
is based on an ex-spouse's need, and if in reality that need decreases,
alimony probably should be reduced or even terminated."3 ° "It should
make no difference whether the ex-spouse has remarried, is living in a
meritricious relationship with a person of the opposite sex, or is living
with a gay partner."' 3 ' Justice Sears-Collins also pointed out that
while the relationships of married couples are clearly defined by law,
lesbian and gay couples in Georgia cannot legally marry.1 2 Thus, she
noted that unlike couples of the opposite sex who live together but are

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(b)) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 722, 425 S.E.2d at 855.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Sears-Collins, J., concurring).
Id. (Sears-Collins, J., concurring).
Id. (Sears-Collins, J., concurring).
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not married, lesbian and gay couples are denied the "numerous legal
rights that come with marriage." 3
These rights include the right to: a) file joint income tax returns; b)
create a marital life estate trust; c) claim estate tax marital deductions;
d) claim family partnership tax income; e) recover damages based on
injury to a partner; f) receive survivors benefits; g) enter hospitals, jails
and other places restricted to "immediate family"; h) live in neighborhoods zoned for "family only"; i) obtain "family" health insurance,
dental insurance, bereavement leave and other employment benefits;
j) collect unemployment benefits if they quit their job to move with
their partner to a new location because he or she has obtained a new
job; k) get residency status for a noncitizen partner to avoid deportation; 1)automatically make medical decisions in the event a partner is
injured or incapacitated; and m) automatically inherit a partner's
property in the event he or she dies without a will. [In addition,]
"[miany of the other legal consequences of gay 'coupling' are not so
immediately apparent, but surface only at times of
stress-misunderstandings, separation and death.""
Furthermore, Justice Sears-Collins stated that based on the many
rights denied to gay couples, it is clear that the law does not encourage
permanent gay arrangements: The law does not provide gay couples the
same acceptance and support, the same governmental, legal, or social
service benefits, or the many tax and other economic benefits accorded
to married couples.135 She then stated that it would not be fair to
expand the statute "so as to saddle gay and lesbian couples with a
penalty accorded unwed heterosexual couples who live together who
have the choice of taking advantage of the benefits of marriage without
according homosexual couples who live together the benefits of a
relationship" that can never be obtained under the law.3 6 Therefore,
this case, like Owens, concerned a matter of statutory interpretation in
which the court reached an opposite result.
In 1995, in City of Atlanta v. McKinney,' 31 the Georgia Supreme
Court held that the City of Atlanta exceeded its power to provide
benefits to employees and their dependents by recognizing domestic
partners as "a family relationship" and by providing employee benefits
to them as if they were legal spouses."
This case involved multiple

133. Id. (Sears-Collins, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 722-23, 425 S.E.2d at 855 (Sears-Collins, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 723, 425 S.E.2d at 855 (Sears-Collins, J., concurring).
136. Id.

137. 265 Ga. 161, 454 S.E.2d 517 (1995).
138. Id. at 165, 454 S.E.2d at 521.
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appeals challenging Atlanta ordinances that prohibited discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation, established a domestic-partnership
registry for jail visitation, and extended insurance and other employee
benefits to domestic partners of city employees. The trial court ruled that
the city exceeded its powers in enacting the domestic-partnership
ordinances, but dismissed the claims challenging the anti-discrimination
laws.139
"In June 1993, the city council passed an ordinance [permitting] the
establishment of a domestic partnership registry in the city's business
license office." 4 ° Ordinance 93-0-0776 defined domestic partners as
"'two people of the opposite or same gender who live together in the
mutual interdependence of a single home and have signed a Declaration
of Domestic Partnership.'"' 4 ' The Declaration was "a city form in
which the partners 'agree[d] to be jointly responsible and obligated for
the necessities of life for each other.'' 142 In August 1993, the city
council also enacted an ordinance extending employee benefits to
domestic partners.
According to this newly adopted ordinance, the
City of Atlanta recognized that domestic partners are a family relationship, but not a marital relationship. 1 The ordinance provided:
sick leave, funeral leave, parental leave, health and dental benefits,
and any other employee benefit available to a City employee in a
comparable manner for a domestic partner, as defined herein, as for a
spouse to the extent that the extension of such benefits does not
conflict with existing laws of the State of Georgia."
Subsequent to the passage of the ordinance, state actors filed a
declaratory-judgment action seeking to have the four ordinances declared
invalid and unconstitutional.'"
The court described the issue in McKinney as "whether the city
impermissibly expanded the definition of dependent to include domestic
partners." 14' The court reasoned that although the ordinance did not
define "dependent," other state statutes define it as a "spouse, child, or

139.
140.
141.

Id. at 161, 454 S.E.2d at 519.
Id. at 162, 454 S.E.2d at 519; ATLANTA, GA. CODE 93-0-0776 (1993).
265 Ga. at 162, 454 S.E.2d at 519 (quoting ATLANTA, GA., CODE 93-0-0776).

142.

Id.
Id. (citing ATLANTA, GA., CODE 93-0-1057, § 3 (1993)).

143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.

Id. (quoting ATLANTA, GA., CODE 93-0-1057, § 3).
Id.

147. Id. at 164, 454 S.E.2d at 521.
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one who relies on another for support. " 148
Therefore, the court
concluded that the powers of municipalities must be strictly construed,
and any doubt about the existence of a certain power must be resolved
against the municipality.'49 Ultimately, the court stated that it was
"beyond the city's authority to define dependents inconsistent with state
law ..
,,15o
Finally, in 2002, the Georgia Court of Appeals decided Burns v.
Burns,15' enforcing a child custody agreement against a homosexual
mother and her partner.'52 The agreement prohibited either parent
from having child visitation if he or she cohabited or had overnight stays
with someone to whom he or she was not legally married. 5 3 The
relevant custody provision provided: "[Tihere shall be no visitation nor
residence by the children with either party during any time where such
party cohabits with or has overnight stays with any adult to which such
party is not legally married or to whom the party is not related within
the second degree." 5 4 The mother contended on appeal that she and
her female companion were married in Vermont and, pursuant to "the
full faith and credit doctrine," were married in Georgia.' 55 She further
argued that she had a fundamental right to privacy, which included the
right to define her own family,
and the State of Georgia could not place
56
limitations on that right.'
The court held that the mother and her female companion were not
actually married in Vermont; they instead entered into a "civil union."' 57 The statute under which they were joined "expressly distinguishe[d] between 'marriage,' which is defined as 'the legally recognized
union of one man and one woman,' and 'civil union,' which is defined as
a relationship established between two eligible persons pursuant to that
chapter." 55
The court further noted that the next section of the
Vermont statute re-emphasized the distinction, "requiring that eligible

148.
(Supp.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-886 (2001); 45-18-8 (1990); 34-9-13 (1993); 48-7-26
1994)).
Id. at 165, 454 S.E.2d at 521.

Id.
253 Ga. App. 600, 560 S.E.2d 47 (2002).
Id. at 600, 560 S.E.2d at 48.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 601, 560 S.E.2d at 48.
Id.
Id.
Id., 560 S.E.2d at 48-49 (quoting 15 VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 1201(4), 1201(2) (2003)).
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persons must 'be of the same
sex and therefore excluded from the
159
marriage laws of this state.'"
Additionally, the court reasoned that even if Vermont purported to
legalize same-sex marriages, such marriages would not be recognized in
Georgia.16 ° The court noted that O.C.G.A. section 19-3-3.1(a) clearly
states that it is the public policy of Georgia to recognize only the union
of a man and a woman.' 61 Under O.C.G.A. section 19-3-3.1(b),
no marriage between persons of the same sex shall be recognized as
entitled to the benefits of marriage. Any marriage entered into by
persons of the same sex pursuant to a marriage license issued by
another state or foreign jurisdiction or otherwise shall be void in this
state. Any contractual rights granted by virtue of such license shall be
unenforceable in the courts of this state and the courts of this state
shall have no jurisdiction whatsoever under any circumstances to grant
a divorce or separate maintenance with respect to such marriage or
otherwise to consider or rule on any of the parties' respective rights
arising as a result of or in connection with such marriage.'62
Further, the court noted that Georgia is not required to give full faith
and credit to same-sex marriages granted in other states.163 The court
stated that what constitutes a marriage in Georgia is a legislative
function, and judges are bound to follow the clear language of Georgia
statutes.'
The court opined that the mother's privacy claim ignored her role in
creating the consent decree. 1 5 The court held that although she was
entitled to the right of privacy, she waived that right when she agreed
to the consent decree. 1 6 If the mother wanted to ensure that her civil
union would be recognized in the same manner as a marriage, she
should have included language to that effect in the consent decree.'6 7
The court concluded that the consent order provided that visitation
would not be allowed during the time that either parent cohabited with
another adult to whom he or she was not married, and that the mother
and her companion were not legally married in Georgia.r' Therefore,

159.
160.
161.
162.
(1999)).
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id., 560 S.E.2d at 49 (quoting 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1202(2) (2003)).
Id.
Id.; O.C.G.A. § 19-3-3.1 (1999 & Supp. 2003).
Burns, 253 Ga. App. at 601-02, 560 S.E.2d at 49 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 19-3-3.1(b)
Id. at 602, 560 S.E.2d at 49 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738c (2003)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the court refused to construe the language of the decree beyond its plain
meaning.
In summation, there is not a published case in Georgia that addresses
the issue of same-sex adoptions. The cases that are published involving
homosexual rights were decided primarily before Powell and Lawrence
discredited the reasoning in Bowers. Other states have increasingly
recognized same-sex partnerships and marriages in recent months, so
much of the reasoning of Georgia cases is outdated. But there are some
common themes to draw from these cases. First, Georgia courts are
concerned less with homosexual conduct than with the actual proven
effect it has on children. Secondly, Georgia courts are more willing to
give custody to homosexuals if the couple resolves not to share information about their sexual relationships with the children. Third, Georgia
courts are not likely to recognize domestic-partnership benefits because
of the state ban on same-sex marriages. Finally, private agreements
between homosexual couples can be written to take into account the
needs of children.
III.

A.

DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM

InitialReconsiderations

The relevant adoption statutes in Georgia are O.C.G.A. sections 19-83169 and 19-8-6.17o O.C.G.A. section 19-8-3 provides:
(a) Any adult person may petition to adopt a child if the person:
(1) Is at least 25 years of age or is married and living with his
spouse;
(2) Is at least ten years older than the child;
(3) Has been a bona fide resident of this state for at least six months
immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and
(4) Is financially, physically, and mentally able to have permanent
custody of the child.
(b) Any adult person, including but not limited to a foster parent,
meeting the requirements of subsection (a) of this Code section shall be
eligible to apply to the department or a child-placing agency for
consideration as an adoption applicant in accordance with the policies
of the departmerit or the agency.
(c) If a person seeking to adopt a child is married, the petition must be
filed in the name of both spouses; provided, however, that, when the

169. O.C.G.A. § 19-8-3 (1999 & Supp. 2003).
170. O.C.G.A. § 19-8-6 (1999 & Supp. 2003).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

1434

[Vol. 55

child is the stepchild of the party
seeking to adopt, the petition shall be
1 71
filed by the stepparent alone.
O.C.G.A. section 19-8-6(a) provides in pertinent part:
(1) A child whose legal father and legal mother are both living but
are not still married to each other may be adopted by the spouse of
either parent only when the other parent voluntarily and in writing
surrendersall of his rights to the child to that spouse for the purpose
of enabling that spouse to adopt the child and the other parent
consents to the adoption and, where there is any guardian of that child,
each such guardian has voluntarily and in writing surrendered to such
spouse all of his rights to the child for purposes of such adoption; or
(2) A child who has only one parent still living may be adopted by
the spouse of that parent only if that parent consents to the adoption
and, where there is any guardian of that child, each such guardian has
voluntarily and in writing surrendered to such spouse all of his rights
to the child for the purpose of such adoption.' 72
The general process of adopting a child in Georgia consists of the
following steps. First, a verified petition for adoption and an exact copy
of the petition must be filed with the clerk of the superior court having
jurisdiction. 173 The superior courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all
adoption matters except when such jurisdiction is granted to juvenile
courts. 174 In instances in which the legal father and mother of the
child are not living, any person related by blood to the child may file
objections. 175 Prior to the date set by the court for a hearing on the
petition, it is the duty of a court-appointed child-placing agency or any
other independent agent appointed by the court to verify the allegations
in the adoption petition, to make a complete and thorough investigation
of the matter, including a criminal background check of each petitioner,
and to report its findings and recommendations in writing to the court
where the petition for adoption was filed. 7 6 In cases in which the
child is being adopted by a step-parent or a relative, the investigation is
17
not mandatory but may be required at the discretion of the court.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

§ 19-8-3 (emphasis added).
§ 19-8-6(a) (emphasis added).
§ 19-8-13 (1999 & Supp. 2003).
§ 19-8-2(a) (1999).
§ 19-8-15 (1999).
§ 19-8-16(a) (1999 & Supp. 2003).
§ 19-8-16(b).
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After an agency's investigation of an adoption, the written investigation report must verify the allegations contained in the adoption
petition.17 The report must also include:
[the] [c]ircumstances under which the child came to be placed for
adoption; .. . [w]hether each proposed adoptive parent is financially,
physically, and mentally able to have the permanent custody of the
child; ... [tihe physical and mental condition of the child, insofar as
this can be determined by the aid of competent medical authority;...
[w]hether or not the adoption is in the best interests of the child,
including his general care; [the] [sluitability of the home to the child;
... [i]f applicable, whether the identity and location of the biological
father who is not the legal father are known or ascertainable and
whether the ... [notice provisions regarding the biological father have
been] complied with; and ... [a]ny other information that might be
disclosed by the investigation that would be of any value or interest to
the court in deciding the case. 179
If after conducting an investigation, the investigating agency disapproves of the adoption, it may file a motion to dismiss the petition.'
After a hearing the judge may then grant the motion to dismiss.'
If
the court denies the motion to dismiss, the court must appoint a
guardian ad litem who is authorized to appeal the ruling.182 The court
may also appoint a guardian for the child if it appears
that the interest
3
of the child and the petitioner are in conflict. 1
In most instances, the hearing for consideration of the petition cannot
be set earlier than sixty days after the filing of the petition."
In
addition, to determine whether the specific requirements of the adoption
provisions have been met, the court is charged with making the
subjective determinations as to whether the petitioner is capable of
assuming responsibility for the child, whether the child is suitable for
adoption in a private family home, and whether the adoption is in the
best interests of the child. 88 Due to the inherently subjective nature
of the best-interest-of-the-child standard, judicial opinions differ as to
which situations adequately meet this standard. The judge exercises

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

O.C.G.A. § 19-8-17(a)(1) (1999).
Id. § 19-8-17(a).
Id. § 19-8-17(b).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 19-8-17(c).
O.C.G.A. § 19-8-14 (1999 & Supp. 2003).
O.C.G.A. § 19-8-18(b) (1999 & Supp. 2003).

1436

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

wide discretion in adoption proceedings, and the court's decision will not
186
be disturbed unless abuse is clearly demonstrated.
B.

Types of Adoption

1. Second-Parent Adoption. There are three types of adoption:
second-parent adoption, agency adoption, and private-placement
adoption."' The term "second-parent adoption" in the context of this
Comment refers to the action by a homosexual to legally adopt the
children (biological or adoptive) of his or her partner, as might a
stepmother or stepfather in a heterosexual family.188 O.C.G.A. section
19-8-3(c) is presumably the section that would apply if the partner of a
biological parent wished to adopt a child. 8 9 Second-parent adoptions
have been permitted in Georgia for same-sex couples at the trial court
level in some counties.'90 States with higher courts that have denied
second-parent adoptions for same-sex couples have usually not denied
adoption on the basis of sexual orientation per se, but on a combination
of a narrow reading of the adoption statute and the unavailability of
marriage to same-sex couples. 9' States that have permitted secondparent adoptions have interpreted the statutes to incorporate the bestinterest-of-the-child standard and held this standard to be the determining factor when it comes to the welfare of children.' 92 For example,
the highest courts in Vermont, Massachusetts, and New York permit
step-parent adoptions for same-sex couples. 9 ' Appellate level courts
in New Jersey, Illinois, and the District of Columbia also permit stepparent adoptions for same-sex partners."M
In addition, numerous
states have permitted step-parent adoptions for same-sex couples at the
lower court level, including Georgia, Alabama, Indiana, Ohio, Texas,

186. Nix v. Sanders, 136 Ga. App. 859, 223 S.E.2d 21 (1975).
187. Adoption by Lesbians and Gay Men: An Overview of the Law in the 50 States,
Lambda Legal, availableat http:J/www.lambdalegal.orgcgi-bin/iowa/documentsrecord?reco
rd=ll (last acccessed Feb. 9, 2004).
188. See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt.
1993); In re Evan, 153 Misc. 2d 844 (1992).
189. O.C.G.A. § 19-8-3(c).
190. See O.C.G.A. §§ 19-8-3, 19-8-6; Overview of State Adoption Laws, supra note 2.
191. See In re Angel Lace, 516 N.W.2d 678, 682-85 (Wis. 1994); In re T.K.J. & K.A.K.,
931 P.2d 488, 491-92 (Colo. App. 1996).
192. See B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1276; Evans, 153 Misc. 2d at 845.
193. See B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1276; Evans, 153 Misc. 2d at 845; Tammy, 619 N.E.2d
at 321.
194. In re C.M.A., 715 N.E.2d. 674, 680 (111. App. 1999); In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662
A.2d. 837, 840 (D.C. App. 1995).
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Maryland, and Michigan, to name a handful.'9 5 However, these trialcourt decisions do not hold much precedential value and depend on the
subjective tastes of the individual judges.
In contrast, three
states-Wisconsin, Florida, and New Hampshire-have expressly
forbidden step-parent adoptions for same-sex couples by law.'
Further, a majority of states, including Georgia, have either not
considered this issue9 7 or the issue has not reached the appellate or
supreme court level.
O.C.G.A. section 19-8-6 provides that when a child is adopted, the
existing parent loses all legal rights with respect to that child unless the
adopting parent is the spouse or step-parent of the child's existing
parent.'
Therefore, except with respect to a spouse of the petitioner
and relatives of the spouse, a decree of adoption terminates all legal
relationships between the adopted individual and his relatives, including
his parent. Accordingly, after the child is adopted he becomes a stranger
to his former relatives for the purposes of inheritance, and instruments
that do not expressly include him by name, or some designation based
on a parent-child or blood relationship."
In summation, Georgia law provides that a child whose legal father
and mother are living but are not still married may be adopted by either
parent's spouse. However, such an adoption can only take place when
the parent whose spouse is not seeking to adopt surrenders all rights to
the child to the petitioner for the purpose of enabling the petitioner to
adopt. If the child has a guardian, the guardian also must surrender all
rights to the child. Additionally, the petitioner's spouse must consent to
the adoption."w If the child sought to be adopted has only one parent
still living, the surviving parent must consent. In this situation, any
guardian of the child must surrender all rights to the petitioner.2 °'
The written surrender, as well as the acknowledgment of the surrender,
must be attached to the petition for adoption when it is filed.2 °2 The
petitioner must also file all appropriate certificates regarding the child's
birth, the marriage of each petitioner, the divorce or death of each
adoptive child's parent, any applicable guardianship papers, and a record
detailing the child's background information.0 3 The pertinent ques-

195. Overview of State Adoption Laws, supra note 2.
196. Overview of State Adoption Laws, supra note 2.
197. See Overview of State Adoption Laws, supra note 2.
198. O.C.G.A. § 19-8-6(a)(1).
199. O.C.G.A. § 19-8-19(a)(1) (1999 & Supp. 2003).
200. O.C.G.A. § 19-8-6(a)(1).
201. Id. § 19-8-6(a)(2).
202. O.C.G.A. § 19-8-13(a)(4).
203. Id.
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tion then becomes whether one partner will have to face losing rights to
her child in order for the other partner to gain them. Further, because
consent to the termination of parental rights is a prerequisite for a court
to permit an adoption, and because, in this scenario, the original parent
does not logically wish to give up his or her rights, courts may feel forced
to deny the adoption based on the plain language of the law.2 4 An
additional question specific to Georgia is whether this issue will ever
reach the attention of the legislature or higher courts, or if same-sex
adoptions will continue to be decided only by the interpretations of trial
judges.
2. Agency Adoption. Agency adoption refers to adoption of a foster
child placed in an individual's care by a state child welfare agency for a
specific period of time.20 5
O.C.G.A. section 19-8-3(a) permits an
unmarried person to become a foster parent.0 6 Once a foster child
becomes eligible for adoption, foster parents are usually given preference
if they choose to adopt.0 7 With same-sex couples the usual practice
is for an individual to apply to be a foster parent in hopes the state will
allow the partner to later adopt as a second-parent. 20 8 An agency
adoption can also involve second-parent adoption if the partner of the
legal foster parent joins in the foster parent's petition to adopt.0 9
3. Private-Placement Adoption. Private-placement adoptions
refer to adoptions arranged without the direct involvement of the state.
These adoptions usually include adoptions through privately run, stateapproved adoption agencies, the adoption of children of family members
or friends when the biological parents consent or are deceased, and
adoption of foreign orphans brought into the United States. Because
adoption is a creation of state statute, every adoption, even those
privately arranged, must be approved by the court and generally require
a home investigation, like agency adoptions. The standard for all
adoptions is the best interests of the child, and private agencies licensed
by the state must follow the same guidelines as those for state agencies
in evaluating the prospective parents and the placement of children.
Thus, private-placement adoption issues largely mirror the issues
involved with agency adoptions. If a homosexual couple, rather than

204. See Angel Lace, 516 N.W.2d at 682-85; T.KJ., 931 P.2d at 491-92.
205. Adoption by Lesbians and Gay Men, supra note 187.
206. O.C.G.A. § 19-8-3(a).
207.

See id.

208. Adoptions by Lesbians and Gay Men, supra note 187.
209. Adoptions by Lesbians and Gay Men, supra note 187.
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just an individual, wishes to adopt a child through a private-placement
adoption, the issue of whether state law allows second-parent adoptions
becomes relevant.2 1 °
C. PersuasiveAuthority from Other Jurisdictions
Although Georgia's higher courts have not had the opportunity to hear
a same-sex adoption petition, a literal interpretation of the current
statute could result in denials of same-sex adoptions. 2" However, an
individual homosexual person may adopt under the "any person"
provision of the current adoption statute, as long as the adoption is
found to be in the best interest of the child. 2 Further, some Georgia
trial courts award second-parent adoptions.21 3 In addition to the
statute, there is an overriding premise in Georgia, and in most states,
that adoption statutes should be construed in the best interest of the
child. 2 4 This tool of construction leaves room for discretionary interpretation by an individual judge in each particular case.2' 5 When
faced with this issue, Georgia courts may logically look to decisions from
neighboring jurisdictions.
A neighboring state in the same federal circuit as Georgia that will
likely be considered for its persuasive authority is Florida. Florida is
one of the few states with an explicit prohibition against homosexual
adoption. 21 6' Florida statute 63.042(3) provides that no "homosexual"
may adopt.2"7 However, it is important to look at the reasoning of the
courts in Florida to determine if this is the best approach. For example,
in Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Cox, 218 a Florida

district court of appeal upheld the constitutionality of the statute and
refused to allow two men to adopt a child. 219 The court reasoned that
the word "homosexual" within the statute was not vague because the
legislature is not required to define every word in a statute for it to
survive a vagueness challenge.220 Plaintiffs also alleged that the
statute violated their privacy rights, but the court noted that plaintiffs

210. Adoption by Lesbians and Gay Men, supra note 187.
211. See O.C.G.A- §§ 19-8-3, 19-8-6.
212. See O.C.G.A. § 19-8-3.
213. See Overview of State Adoption Laws, supra note 2.
214. See Shepard v. Landers, 193 Ga. App. 392, 388 S.E.2d 12 (1989); 2 AM. JUR. 2d
Adoption § 137 (2003).
215. See Nix, 136 Ga. App. at 859, 223 S.E.2d at 21.
216. See Overview of State Adoption Laws, supra note 2.
217. FLA. STAT. ch. 63.042(3) (2003).
218. 627 So. 2d 1210 (2d Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
219. Id. at 1220.
220. Id. at 1214.
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volunteered the information that they were homosexual.22 ' The court
reasoned that the statute did not mandate any specific inquiry into any
individual applicant's background and that adoption was not a private
matter but a statutory privilege.222 Further, the court stated that the
adoption statute did not violate due process because the opportunity to
adopt an unrelated child is not a fundamental right.22 The court also
opined that the right to engage in homosexual activity is not a fundamental liberty.224 The court denied an equal protection claim by
plaintiffs and upheld the Florida adoption statute stating that plaintiffs
did not overcome the statute's presumption of rationality.225 In 1995
the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the district court in part, but
remanded the equal protection issue to the trial court for further
proceedings, stating that the record was insufficient to determine that
the statute could be sustained under a rational basis scrutiny.226
In contrast, in Jacoby v. Jacoby,2 7 Florida's Second District Court
of Appeal reversed a decision that denied child custody to a child's
biological mother and her female partner.2 28 During the couple's
marriage, Mrs. Jacoby informed her husband that she had fallen in love
with a family friend who was a lesbian. Mrs. Jacoby and her children
then moved into the home of her female partner. While the divorce was
pending, the children visited Mr. Jacoby every other weekend and then
rotated custody, alternating between the two homes on a weekly basis.
Both parties sought primary custody of the two children. Mrs. Jacoby
proposed that the children live with her and her partner, and Mr. Jacoby
proposed that the children live with him and his soon-to-be new wife and
her children. 29
The psychologist at trial stated that both parties were good parents
but that the mother had better parenting skills. Other evidence showed
that the children had stronger emotional ties to the mother and that she
would be the best at promoting contact with the noncustodial parent.
Therefore, the psychologist recommended that the mother receive
primary custody. However, the lower court awarded custody to the
father.2 3

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1216.
Id. at 1217.
Id.
Id. at 1220.
Cox v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995).
763 So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The district court reasoned that to properly consider conduct such as
sexual orientation on the issue of custody, the conduct must have a
direct effect or impact on the children.23 1 Therefore, "'[tihe mere
possibility of negative impact on the child is not enough.'" 2 2 The court
held that the connection between the conduct and the harm must have
an evidentiary basis and cannot be assumed.233 The court reasoned
that although the district court's order addressed the community's
reactions to homosexuals by noting that a social stigma attaches to
homosexuality, even if the reactions were true, the law could not give
effect to private biases. 2 ' Even if the law permitted consideration of
personal biases, and even if the court accepted the assumption that
living with the mother and her partner would hurt the children, these
biases and harm would derive, not from the fact that the children were
living with their homosexual mother, but from the fact that she is a
homosexual. 235 Therefore, the court held that the district court's
reliance on perceived biases was an improper basis for child custody
determinations and that the children were not harmed by living with
their mother and her partner. 6
In Kazmierazak v. Query," 7 a Florida district court of appeal
affirmed a trial court order dismissing a nonbiological parent's petition
for custody and denied her motion for temporary visitation of her
partner's biological child. 23" Appellant argued that she was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing to establish that she was a "psychological parent"
of appellee's biological child. 2 9 As a psychological parent, she contended that she had parental status equal to the biological mother, which
gave her standing to seek custody or visitation of appellee's child over
objection. 24 In her petition, appellant alleged that "appellee 'may not
be a fit and proper person to retain custody of the minor,' and 'it is in
the best interests of the minor' that custody be granted to appellant."241 However, appellant did not seek relief under any statute, did

231. Id. at 413 (citing Maradie v. Maradie, 680 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1996)).
232. Id. (quoting Maradie, 680 So. 2d at 543).
233. Id. (citing Maradie, 680 So. 2d at 543).
234. Id. (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
235. Id. (citing Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio App. 1987); M.P. v. S.P., 404
A.2d 1256 (N.J. App. Div. 1979)).
236. Id. at 413-14.
237. 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
238. Id. at 106.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 107.
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not allege that the child was suffering any demonstrable harm, and did
not allege that it would be detrimental to the child to deny her custody
or visitation.242 The district court reasoned that appellant's petition
"confront[ed] a procedural hurdle" in that she was not seeking relief
pursuant to a statute. 43
Further, the court reasoned that under
Florida law, to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, a nonparent may
petition for custody or visitation of another's child only under statutory
244
authority.
The court further noted that although appellant's petition was not
filed pursuant to a statute, appellant argued that, as a psychological
parent, her status was equivalent to that of a biological parent, thereby
allowing her to petition for custody.245 Although the court previously
recognized the concept of a psychological parent, the court in those cases
focused solely on the best interests of the child without explicitly
resolving the question of whether-the psychological parent had standing
to seek visitation. 24' Thus, the court reasoned that in previous cases
the biological parent's right to privacy went unresolved and must be
reconsidered in light of recent precedent.247 Specifically, the court
stated that subsequent to the decision in those cases, the Florida
Supreme Court, citing the fundamental and constitutional right of
privacy, reaffirmed adoptive or biological parents' rights to make
decisions about their children's welfare without interference by third
parties. 2' Therefore, the court noted that the state cannot intervene
into a parent's fundamental or constitutionally protected right of privacy
without a showing of demonstrable harm to the child.249 Although the
court had recognized the concept of a psychological parent, in light of
recent Florida Supreme Court jurisprudence, it could not construe these
cases as holding that a psychological parent is entitled to parental status
equivalent to that of the biological parent. 2 0 Therefore, the court held
that without a status equivalent to the biological parent, appellant

242.
243.
244.
re C.M.
2d 343,
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Russo v. Burgos, 675 So. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); In
& F.M., 601 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); M.M.M.A. v. Jonely, 677 So.
346 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
Id.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 109.
Id. (citing Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 514-15 (Fla. 1998)).
Id.
Id.

20041

GEORGIA'S CHILDREN

1443

lacked standing to seek custody or visitation of appellee's biological child
against appellee's wishes.25 '
Justice Gross concurred specially, stating that "[t]he real problem in
this area is section 63.042(3). . ., which prevents someone like appellant
from creating that type of legal relationship with a child that would
confer legal rights and obligations."25 2 Neither this court nor the
Florida Supreme Court has ruled on the constitutionality of section
63.042(3) under the privacy amendment of the Florida Constitution or
the Equal Protection Clause..2 " Gross noted that in Cox, the court
passed on the constitutionality of the statute, but that case did not
appear to be the last word on the issue. 2' He further opined that an
important factor driving the decision in Cox was the absence of any
evidence in the record in support of the parties' positions.5
Additionally, Georgia may look to the law of Alabama as persuasive
authority. Alabama falls in the middle range on this issue, much like
Georgia. 2 ' The adoption statute in Alabama provides for adoption by
"any adult person or husband and wife jointly."5 7 Second-parent
25
but
adoptions have been approved in some Alabama lower courts,
59
the case law reveals hostility toward gay parents.
For example, in 1998, in Ex parte J.M.F.,260 the Alabama Supreme
Court denied custody to a child's mother and her female partner who
openly displayed their homosexual relationship.26 1 The parties were
divorced, and the trial court awarded custody of the parties' minor
daughter to the mother. Shortly thereafter, the mother began a
homosexual relationship and decided that both she and her daughter
should live with her partner. Although the apartment had three
bedrooms, the mother began sharing a bedroom with her girlfriend. The
father was aware of the relationship but believed that the mother and
her girlfriend would maintain a discreet relationship. However, the
father later learned that his former wife was sharing a bedroom with her
girlfriend, that their child occasionally slept with them in their bed, and

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at 110.
Id. at 111 (Gross, J., concurring specially).
Id. (Gross, J., concurring specially).
Id. (Gross, J., concurring specially) (citing Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210).
Id. (Gross, J., concurring specially) (citing Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210).
See Overview of State Adoption Laws, supra note 2.
ALA. CODE § 26-10A-5 (2003).
See Overview of State Adoption Laws, supra note 2.
See Ex Parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190 (Ala. 1998).
730 So. 2d 1190 (Ala. 1998).
Id. at 1191-92.
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that they kissed in the child's presence.262 Also, during the father's
visitation, his child informed him that "girls could marry girls and boys
could marry boys."2" Subsequently, the father moved to modify the
divorce judgment to obtain custody of the daughter.2"'
After considering all the evidence, the trial court entered an order
changing custody to the father, finding that this change would materially promote the child's best interests. The court also set forth the
mother's visitation rights."
"The court initially restricted the mother's visits by ordering that she not 'exercise her right of visitation with
the minor child of the parties in the presence of a person to whom she
is not related by blood or marriage.'" 2 6 The trial court subsequently
modified the order to provide that "the restriction 'shall not apply and
be considered as being applicable to the general
public, casual, profes267
sional, platonic or business relationships.'"
The court of appeals pointed out that, in Alabama, evidence of a
parent's heterosexual misconduct cannot, in itself, support a change of
custody unless the trial court finds that the misconduct has a detrimental effect upon the child. 2' Applying this standard, the court determined that the record contained no evidence indicating that the mother's
relationship had a "substantial detrimental effect" upon the child, and
thus concluded that the trial court improperly
changed custody based
269
solely upon the mother's homosexuality.
However, the supreme court noted that "[tihe trial court was presented
with evidence of two important changes in the circumstances of the
parties that occurred since their divorce." 270 First, there was evidence
that the mother and her girlfriend established an open lesbian relationship, which they explained to the child and demonstrated with affection
in the presence of the child on a regular basisY.1 Further, although
the mother testified that she did not have any significant concern about
the adverse effect of her changing from a married heterosexual to a
committed homosexual would have on her child, the mother stated that
it would be up to the child to cope with any ridicule or prejudice that she

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id.
Id. at 1192.
Id.
Id. at 1193-94.
Id. at 1194.
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might suffer because "all children have to cope with prejudice anyway."272 The court further noted that the mother and her girlfriend
had homosexual couples as guests in their home and would not
discourage the child from adopting a homosexual lifestyle.273
There was also evidence indicating that the father is no longer a single
parent, but had established a happy marriage with a woman who loves
the child, assists in her care, and has demonstrated a commitment to
sharing the responsibility of child rearing.27 4 Additionally, the court
noted that the child expressed love for the stepmother and acceptance of
her as a parental figure.27
The court considered the fact that the
father and the stepmother had a house with ample room for the child,
and that they were able to provide for her material, emotional, and
physical needs.276
Lastly, the court noted that the trial court reviewed a number of
scientific studies concerning the effects on children who are raised by
homosexual couples.2 77 Much of the information presented by those
studies suggested that a homosexual couple with good parenting skills
is just as likely to successfully rear a child as is a heterosexual
couple. 27" However, the court noted that other studies indicated "that
a child reared by a homosexual couple is more likely to experience
isolation, behavioral problems, and depression and that the optimum
environment for rearing a child is one where both a male and a female
role model are present, living together in a marriage relationship."2 79
The court concluded that while the evidence showed that the mother
loved the child and provided her with good care, it also showed that she
chose "to expose the child continuously to a lifestyle that is 'neither legal
in this state, nor moral in the eyes of most of its citizens.'"28 0 The
court stated that the record contained
evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that "[a] child
raised by two women or two men is deprived of extremely valuable
developmental experience and the opportunity for optimal individual
growth and interpersonal development" and that "the degree of harm

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

277. Id.
278. Id.

279. Id. at 1195-96.
280. Id. at 1196 (quoting Ex Parte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998)).
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to children from the homosexual conduct of a parent is uncertain...
and the range of potential harm is enormous."28 '
Georgia courts may also consider cases from jurisdictions whose courts
For example, the Suunequivocally permit same-sex adoptions. 2
preme Court of Vermont, in In re B.L.VB. & E.L.VB.,25 ' held that
denying an adoption by same-sex partners would be inconsistent with
the best interests of the children and public policy of the state.2 4 In
this case, a nonbiological mother sought to adopt the biological child of
her partner. The couple had lived together monogamously for over seven
years, and the biological mother was impregnated by an anonymous
sperm donor.2 8 5 The supreme court reasoned that the "paramount
28 6
concern" of the court should always be the child's best interests.
Further, the court opined that by permitting the adoption, it furthered
the original purpose of the adoption statute (promoting the child's best
interests) and allowed children the benefits and security of a legal
relationship with their parents. 8 7 The court noted that reproductive
technologies and society's recognition of alternative lifestyles has
advanced, so that a biological connection is no longer the only "organizing principle" of family structures.2
The court stated that courts are left to protect the public interest in
the children's financial support and emotional well-being by developing
theories of parenthood so that a "parent" may be awarded custody,
It further stated that a court
visitation, or reached for support.8 9
should work to prevent the years of litigation that can result while
children remain in limbo and are sometimes denied the affection of a
"parent" who has been with them since birth.290
Furthermore, the adoption statute in this case is very similar to the
Specifically, the Vermont statutes
adoption statute in Georgia.29 '
individual
or
husband and wife together.2 ' The
permit adoption by an
adoption statute requires termination of parental rights for a person not

281. Id. (quoting Lynn D. Wardle, The PotentialImpact of Homosexual Parenting on
Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 895 (1997)).
282. See also Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 315; In re Bruce, 661 A.2d 107 (Conn. 1995).
283. 628 A.2d 1271 (1993).
284. Id. at 1276.
285. Id. at 1272.
286. Id. at 1276.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Compare O.C.G.A. §§ 19-8-3 and 19-8-6 to 15 VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 431, 438 (2003).
292. See 15 VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 431, 448; B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271.
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married to the biological parent to adopt the child.293 However, the
supreme court reasoned that this provision anticipated that the child
94
would actually be removed from the home of the biological parent.
In the case of a same-sex couple, the court noted that it would not make
sense to terminate the parental rights of the biological parent when the
parent will remain in the same household with the child and newly
adopted parent.29 5 The court opined that the purpose of the statute as
a whole was to clarify and protect the legal rights of an adopted person,
not to prohibit adoptions by certain individuals.2 96 Further, the court
stated that a narrow construction of the statute requiring termination
of the biological parents' parental rights "would produce the unreasonable and irrational result of defeating adoptions that are otherwise
indisbutably in the best interests of the children."2 97
Also, in In re Evan,29 the Surrogate's Court of New York County
granted an adoption to a same-sex couple, finding that it was in the best
interests of the child. 2" The court reasoned that if the adoption was
denied and the couple later separated, the woman who was not the
child's biological mother would have no rights to visitation even if
evidence showed that denying visitation would be harmful to the
child.3 °0 The court opined that it is better for a child to continue a
relationship with both parents, and the law recognizes this concept by
presuming that parental visitation is in the best interests of the child
absent proof that it will be harmful.3 °' The court also noted that even
if the couple in this case stayed together, significant emotional benefits
would result from the adoption, such as the child's formal recognition in
Further, the child would gain generous
an organized society.302
medical and educational benefits through the adoption.0 3
The court also noted that although the actual number of children
being raised in lesbian homes was unknown, as of 1987, estimates

293. See 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 448; B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271.
294. B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1274.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. (citing Lubinsky v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd., 527 A.2d 227, 228 (1986)).
298. 153 Misc. 2d 844 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1992).
299. Id. at 851.
300. Id. at 846.
301. Id. (citing Wise v. Del Torro, 505 N.Y.S.2d 880 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Resnick v.
Zoldan, 520 N.Y.S.2d 434 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Bubbins v. Bubbins, 493 N.Y.S.2d 869
(N.Y. App. Div. 1985)).
302. Id.
303. Id.
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ranged from six to ten million.3 In addition, research on the differences between children of homosexual and heterosexual parents, in
otherwise comparable circumstances,
revealed no significant disadvan30 5
tages of the former over the latter.
Also, the New York statute in this case is similar to the previously
mentioned Vermont and Georgia adoption statutes.3 ° Specifically, it
allows adoption by an unmarried person and a husband and wife jointly
and requires the termination of parental rights by the biological parent
when someone other than a legal spouse petitions to adopt the child.3 °7
However, the court stated that to terminate the rights of the biological
mother when she will continue to be a mother to the child in the same
household is an absurd interpretation of the adoption statute and should
be avoided. 0 8 Moreover, the court reasoned that an underlying policy
of the statute was to allow a husband and wife to jointly adopt a child
and that this policy is furthered by permitting the adoption of a child
who recognizes these life-long partners as parents. 0 9
Therefore, there are currently three different forms of jurisprudence
pertaining to same-sex adoption in the United States. First, adoption
statutes in Florida are among the minority and explicitly ban adoption
by homosexuals in general. Second, adoption statutes in Alabama and
Georgia do not explicitly ban homosexual adoptions but do not expressly
provide for them. Higher courts in these states have not addressed this
issue, but lower courts have permitted some same-sex adoptions.
Finally, statutes in states like Vermont and New York do not explicitly
provide for same-sex adoptions, but the courts have looked to the best
interests of the children and the purpose behind the adoption statutes
in order to permit adoptions when they are in the best interests of
children.
IV.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND THE BEST FIT FOR GEORGIA

When adoption statutes were first written, it would have been hard for
any legislature to anticipate the changes the family structure has
embraced over the last fifty years. Because most adoption statutes do
not specifically permit or prohibit adoptions by same-sex couples, until
the legislature amends adoption statutes, courts in most states are left

304. Id. at 851.
305. Id.
306. Compare O.C.G.A. §§ 19-8-3 and 19-8-6, 15 VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 431, 438 to N.Y.
DOM. REL. §§ 110, 117(1) (2004).
307. See N.Y. DOM. REL. §§ 110, 117(1).
308. 153 Misc. 2d at 848.
309. Id. at 846.
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with the uncertainty of interpreting a statute not designed to cope with
this issue. For example, only three states, including Florida, have
adoption statutes that specifically deny adoption to homosexuals.1 0
These statutes have come under tremendous criticism by the ABA and
have faced many state and federal constitutional challenges.3 1 '
Because Georgia falls within the middle range of states on this issue,
not specifically prohibiting the adoptions, but not strongly embracing
them, it is hard to speculate whether Georgia's higher courts will permit
adoptions by same-sex couples in the near future. However, an educated
guess can be formulated in light of the history of Georgia case law and
the judicial opinions and policies handed down from other courts. It is
especially important to emphasize the policy behind these opinions when
dealing with a subject as sensitive as adoption. The determination of the
best interest of the child is inherently subjective and leaves judges with
an extremely difficult decision.
At first blush, Georgia case law seems to be very limiting in the rights
it affords homosexuals. However, as previously noted in this Comment,
not many cases have been decided since Bowers was overturned by the
United States Supreme Court and discredited by Georgia. Further, in
the context of family law, it is clear that courts will not look at conduct
in and of itself, but at the effect that conduct has on children. Therefore,
in a situation in which a homosexual couples chooses not to share their
sexual beliefs with a child, the court would probably be more likely to
grant an adoption. Scientific studies probably will play a large role in
determining what really is in the best interest of children. This seems
to be more of a battle of the experts, as it is easy to obtain statistics that
go either way. An example of this is Ex parte J.M.F,312 in which the
Alabama Supreme Court decided a case largely based on studies
highlighting the negative impact homosexual behavior would have on the
child. "3
However, in In re Evan3 14 a New York court reviewed studies that pointed largely to the opposite result and permitted the samesex adoption.315
Same-sex adoption seems to be highly analogous to the area of child
custody, in which scientific studies are often introduced to determine the

310. See FLA. STAT. ch. 63.042(3) (2003).
311. See David L. Hudson Jr., Court Won't Tie Lawrence to Gay Adoption Law 11th
Circuit Rejects Arguments by Florida Foster Parents, ABA Journal Report, available at
httpJ/www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/f6adopt.html (Feb. 6, 2004).
312. 730 So. 2d 1190 (Ala. 1998).
313. Id. at 1196.
314. 153 Misc. 2d 844 (1992).
315. Id. at 850 n.1.
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harmful effects on a young child of moving to a different state. It is
likely that wealthier homosexual couples who can afford a good expert
witness will be more likely to succeed in adoption. This view is also
somewhat reflective of the reason the majority of same-sex adoptions in
this state occur in the Atlanta area.
V.

CONCLUSION

When it comes to children, cases are always decided on a case-by-case
basis depending on the individual facts. Adoptions for same-sex couples
should not be different. To make the best decisions, courts need to be
equipped with the best resources and tools to adequately determine what
is in a child's interest without stereotyping or generalizing conduct to
every individual. This issue raises a lot of hard questions that go
beyond the law to morality, theology, and societal norms. Trial judges
are more likely under less public pressure than supreme court justices
to deny an adoption to a same-sex couple because trial court decisions
do not receive as much publicity.
In certain situations, adoption by a same-sex partner could potentially
ensure a child monetary security. For example, when one parent
inherits a large amount of money or wins a large settlement in a
lawsuit, a legally recognized child will also benefit. Georgia requires
child support to be paid by a legally recognized parent for the benefit of
the child. Therefore, it does not make sense to allow a same-sex parent
the ability to walk away from a relationship and not support a child if
he or she has committed to do so as much as a heterosexual partner.
Further, it is troubling that the child is the one caught in the crossfire.
If both of a child's parents are not legally recognized, only the biological
or legally recognized parent can sign forms that require the signature of
a legal guardian, automatically provide health insurance, or allow
emergency medical care. These outcomes seem hard to justify to a child
who recognizes a person as their parent.
Additionally, same-sex marriage is not permitted in this state.
Therefore, some courts may feel that allowing a same-sex couple to adopt
a child is the same as legally recognizing the couple's relationship.
However, in the context of same-sex adoptions, there is always a
different variable present-a child. Therefore, any decisions about
adoption should not turn on whether Georgia accepts or recognizes samesex marriages, but whether a particular child will benefit or be harmed
by a particular situation. As the court in B.L.VB. stated, "[wie are not
called upon to approve or disapprove of the relationship between the
appellants. Whether we do or not the fact remains that ... [the
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nonbiological mother] has acted as a parent of... [the children] from
the moment they were born." 16
NICOLE SHEPPE

316.

628 A.2d at 1276.
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